termination of the higher powers of the soul, and is the end of all distinct and rational representations, appetites and aversions. If the soul dies sensually, it also dies spiritually, and as a result everything is at an end for it. Yet, I will prove below that it is possible for the soul to die spiritually while still retaining its sensual life.

§22

I am now in a position to offer a precise articulation of the concept of the immortality of the soul. Just as we call a being mortal if it is possible for it to die, so that being must be called immortal if it is not possible for it to die. Mortality is the possibility of death, immortality its impossibility. Since only impossible things cannot become actual, those who accept the soul's immortality make a twofold claim: that the soul cannot die, and that it will actually continue to live after the death of the human being. On the other hand, something is not actual just because it is possible, and so someone could affirm the mortality of the soul without it once occurring to him to accept that the soul will actually die at some point. Someone, therefore, who refutes the immortality of the soul does not for that reason prove that it will die, and to accuse him of believing thus is to treat him unjustly. Yet I confess that most of those who deny the soul's immortality have such an impoverished conception that they affirm the mortality and the death of the soul at the same time. All possibility and impossibility is either absolute or hypothetical; consequently, there are two sorts of mortality as well as of immortality. A being is mortal absolutely or in itself if it is possible for that being, considered in itself, to die; and if it is also possible for that being to die when it is considered in conjunction with other things external to it, then it is hypothetically mortal. The human body is mortal in both respects as there are a thousand fatal combinations of things that might conspire to rob it of life. [. . .] It is just the same with immortality. If a thing is supposed to be absolutely immortal, then considered in itself it would have to be contradictory that it should die, and this sort of immortality must be attributed to the supreme being. A being is hypothetically immortal if it is only impossible that it should die considered in a certain connection with other things. That it is impossible that the human body should lose its life as the result of the vigorous onslaught of a gnat or a flea is an example of hypothetical immortality. When we put all of the foregoing together, we can derive the following propositions from it: a thing can be absolutely mortal without being hypothetically mortal in every respect, but not the converse. That which is hypothetically mortal can also die absolutely. That which is absolutely immortal cannot die at all and, consequently, it is hypothetically immortal considered in all respects; yet, a being can be hypothetically immortal without possessing an absolute immortality. I deliberately refrain for the moment from applying these propositions to the soul since this can be done more appropriately in the following. [. . .]

§23

Those who advocate and support that great truth of the soul's immortality must not be satisfied with proving that the soul will continue to live after its departure from the stage of the present time. Rather, they must seek principally to present the nature of this future state in such a way that it can be a powerful motivation for virtue and religion, that it might provide a reason for consolation amidst all of the adversities of